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The people who partake in corruption have an incentive to hide their illicit behavior. This 
represents a strategic challenge to law enforcement officials across Latin American cities. A 
related concern is that formal claims submitted to a city’s anti-corruption agency are 
seldom analyzed in a systematic manner. We respond to these challenges by examining a 
unique (and anonymized) dataset containing 445 claims collected by an urban district 
government in central Mexico. First, we propose a novel typology of urban corruption, 
which can later be applied to analyze corruption-related claims elsewhere. As a next step, 
we apply this typology to study the claims submitted to the district government in 
question. Large agencies and the agencies responsible for regulating the construction sector 
are found to be most vulnerable to corruption. The district as a whole also comes across as 
lacking in transparency and as struggling with bribery and kickback schemes. 
                                                        
1 We thank Frank Anechiarico, Erika de la Garza, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tony Payan, and Alyssa 
Huberts for their helpful feedback. We also thank Lianne Hart for the careful edits. Any remaining 
issues or mistakes are the responsibility of the principal investigator. We dedicate our work to the 
residents of the anonymous district at the center of the study.  
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“Piensa mal y acertarás.”2 
        —Mexican saying 
 
“All sovereigns are suspicious of their servants, and the sovereign people is no exception to 
the rule; but how is suspicion to be allayed by knowledge? If that suspicion could but be 
clarified into wise vigilance, it would be altogether salutary; if that vigilance could be aided 
by the unmistakable placing of responsibility, it could be altogether beneficent. Suspicion 
in itself is never healthful.” 
                     —Woodrow Wilson (1887, 213) 
 
The rapid rate of urbanization across the world poses a unique challenge to policymakers. 
As new cities emerge and as existing ones continue to grow (Cohen 2004, 24; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009, 20-21), the subject of urban governance has taken center 
stage (Fuchs 2012, 44-45; Stren 2012, 570).3 In Latin America, already more than 80 percent 
of the population lives in cities (United Nations 2014). This, in turn, means that urban 
centers across the region concentrate people into spaces where government services and 
regulatory agencies are often overburdened and vulnerable to abuse. Metropolitan Lima, 
Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City—these are only some of the cities that have witnessed recent 
government corruption scandals (El Comercio 2016; Chade 2017; Fredrick 2018). 
And yet the abuse and scandals at the urban level receive scant attention compared to the 
corruption revelations implicating Latin America’s national governments. Brazil’s Lava Jato 
affair, involving the diversion of money from contracts at the state-run oil company, has 
led to several arrests and convictions (Lagunes and Rose-Ackerman 2016). A Guatemalan 
president and vice-president were driven from office over a multi-million dollar fraud case 
involving the customs administration (Goldman 2015). In Mexico, federal agencies 
misappropriated government funds through a network of state universities and shell 
companies (Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción 2017). These and other cases have consumed 
television news programs and the print media alike (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2016). 
 
Unfortunately, in focusing on national-level corruption, the media, government, and the 
general public have missed the equally important story of local corruption. According to 
survey data  (LAPOP 2014), in Latin America, approximately 17 percent of residents pay 
bribes in the process of applying for permits from their city government (Figure 1). This 
statistic is informative, though not entirely reliable. Because survey respondents often fail 
to answer truthfully to uncomfortable questions, that 17 percent reported is likely a lower-
bound estimate of the actual urban corruption problem. This statistic should also be 
treated with caution insofar as it is silent about both the corruption that does not involve 
bribes and the corruption that occurs outside of permitting. Thus, considering these 
                                                        
2 This Mexican saying may be translated to English as, “Think the worst and you won’t be far wrong.” 
It captures the assumption that people are generally not trustworthy. 
3 Urban governance may be defined as, “the processes by which local governments, in partnership with 
other public agencies, the private sector, and the residents, ensure the delivery and financing of 
essential services and promote the welfare and productivity of the urban society” (World Bank 2000, 4). 
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limitations, we aim to complement the existing survey data with an “under the hood” look 
at corruption-related complaints. 
 




Note: According to survey data gathered by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), urban residents 
in the region experience varying levels of corruption when dealing with municipal authorities. The results in this 
figure are based on urban residents who sought a permit from an urban municipal government. Assuming that 
the tendency to underreport corruption does not vary significantly from country to country, the chart shows that, 
in 2014, Haiti, Panama, and Bolivia witnessed the highest levels of urban corruption while Uruguay, El Salvador, 
and Chile experienced the lowest levels of urban corruption. Mexico’s level of urban corruption is about average 
for the region. 
 
 
We examine a unique dataset containing 445 claims submitted over a two-year period to the 
anticorruption agency (or ACA) of a crucial urban district in central Mexico.4 As a response to 
a warning against conflating different types of corrupt phenomena and as a starting point, we 
propose a novel typology of claims inspired by previous taxonomies of corruption (Bussell 
2015). For instance, Michael Johnston (2005; 2014) famously proposed four broad categories 
to classify countries based on the sort of corruption that they experience. Similarly, Susan 
Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie Palifka (2016) describe 13 distinct forms of corruption, including 
bribery, extortion, and embezzlement. Our typology includes these last three forms of 
corruption, though from our perspective, they fit alongside a number of other questionable 
behaviors that are more typical in an urban context. 
 
                                                        
4 The 445 claims and both the anecdotal and contextual information that support this study were 
gathered by Lagunes. The claims were shared with Lagunes through official channels by the district 
government. Furthermore, much of the anecdotal and contextual information was gathered by 
Lagunes during IRB-approved field research. 
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Our study provides a diagnostic of corruption vulnerabilities that can be replicated in other 
urban districts in Mexico and, perhaps, even in other cities across Latin America. By 
applying the proposed taxonomy to a series of corruption claims, we are able to uncover 
the government agencies that attract the most complaints, spotlight trending concerns, and 
unveil key insights. One such insight is that a majority of claims handled by the ACA are 
relevant. However, 22 percent of the claims do not have any apparent connection to 
corruption; instead, they refer to human resource issues and various public service 
concerns. For example, one such claim is from a government official who complains about 
running out of office supplies, while another is from a citizen who is frustrated at 
interruptions to the water supply. Given that ACAs are often overburdened, we 
recommend that irrelevant claims be referred to the appropriate authorities, instead of 
being added to the workload of investigators.  
 
Of course, deciding between relevant and irrelevant complaints is not a simple task. A 
number of claims are so ambiguous that it is unclear whether they refer to corruption or 
inefficiency. This serves as a reminder that corruption and inefficiency are related 
phenomena, and that ACAs cannot afford to ignore inefficiencies. However, the larger 
takeaway is that ACAs everywhere should adopt a relatively loose standard of what counts 
as a relevant claim worth registering in its system. Not every claim should arouse suspicion. 
Along the lines of the Woodrow Wilson quote cited at the beginning, if a claim has at least a 
possible connection to corruption, then it merits inspection. The goal is to provide wise or 
strategic vigilance. 
 
Focusing on the claims that have at least a possible link to corruption, 19 percent of them in 
our dataset refer to instances in which officials limit access to government information. 
Another 14.5 percent of relevant claims point to inefficiencies. Bribery and kickback 
schemes make up 10.2 percent of claims, while the remaining 56.3 percent refer to myriad 
questionable behaviors also covered by our taxonomy. Government employees who 
receive a salary without showing up to work, the suspicious loss of official documents from 
municipal archives, government officials who privilege bureaucratic lobbyists—these are 
some of the unwarranted activities highlighted by our analysis. 
 
In terms of problematic agencies, the relatively large and complex ones will naturally 
collect a great number of claims. This is true for the district being studied, where a vast 
agency that is responsible for multiple subunits—from the Single-Window System for 
Permit Applications to the Public Markets & Street Vending Commission—collects nearly 
twice as many claims as the second-most delinquent agency. 
 
One final insight worth zeroing in on is that, as the relevant research on corruption would 
predict (e.g., Kenny 2007; Riaño and Hodess 2008; Saint-Martin 2015), the agencies 
responsible for regulating the construction sector—specifically, the Department of 
Buildings & City Planning and the Department of Public Works—also stand out as having 
collected a relatively large number of corruption-related claims. These agencies apply 
significant discretion in overseeing capital-intensive activities. 
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Given the findings outlined above, we recommend that the district’s ACA prioritize three 
actionable strategies. First, as noted earlier, the agency should disregard irrelevant claims 
and instead focus its resources on claims that have at least a possible connection to 
corruption. Second, the ACA should recognize the advantages of analyzing corruption in 
a systematic manner. Rather than approaching claims on a case-by-case basis, we 
recommend that it adopt a taxonomy similar to ours as a means of imposing order on 
and enhancing the understanding of the universe of corruption-related claims. Third and 
last, the agency should focus on monitoring the issues and agencies found most 
problematic by our analysis. 
 
The next section places the project in the broader literature. The three sections that then 
follow—i.e., those titled Methodology, About the District, and Claims—provide a detailed 
review of our methodology. It is in this part of the study that our typology of urban 
corruption is discussed in detail. Finally, we showcase the main findings that result from 




As long as government officials have power over the issuing of public goods, such as 
building permits or infrastructure contracts, there is the risk that they will engage in 
corruption (Schleifer and Vishny 1993, 599; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, 33-67; Lagunes 
2012a, 806-807). Bribery and other forms of undue influence are possible whenever 
government agents have the option of delaying or denying a service, or of enforcing the 
law. Thus, corruption is shaped by discretion, but also by the monitoring and sanctioning 
capacity of anticorruption authorities (Olken 2007; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Serra 2012). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the threat of being caught and punished is the reason that officials work to 
conceal malfeasance. This explains why corruption, as a concealed and poorly understood 
phenomenon, torments the researchers who attempt to study it empirically (Rose-
Ackerman 1978, 8; Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996, xiv). A separate concern is that much of the 
relevant research is focused on studying corruption at the national level (e.g., Hellman, 
Jones, and Kaufmann 2003; Lambsdorff 2006; Batzilis 2015; Stephenson 2015). Scarce 
attention is given to the corruption that takes place among city officials, even as some have 
warned that, “cities in many countries are the most accessible form of state power and 
wealth. In the hands of unscrupulous opportunists […] city governments can easily become 
the sites of petty tyrannies or systematic corruption or both” (Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, 
and Parris 2000, 85).  
 
What limited literature exists on urban corruption suggests that particular economic 
activities are especially vulnerable to abuse. As a case in point, urban development is often 
an area of risk. A classic study that analyzes U.S. newspaper reports of corruption cases 
finds that 22.3 percent have to do with the approval of building permits, zoning changes, 
subdivision plans, etc. (Gardiner and Lyman 1978, 7-8). Similarly, two prominent reports 
conclude that bribery is more common in urban development than in any other sector of 
the economy (Bray 2007; Hardoon and Heinrich 2011).  
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Another area of government that is prone to corruption is public infrastructure. The terms 
public infrastructure or public works refer to space-specific goods, such as parks, roads, and 
bridges, built with at least some government funding. Transparency International (Riaño and 
Hodess 2008; Hardoon and Heinrich 2011) finds that public works is one of the sectors with 
the highest corruption vulnerability in developing contexts.5 Corruption can target a public 
infrastructure project at any stage, including procurement and construction (Wells 2014, 24). 
For instance, during the construction stage, developers can inflate the contract sum in an 
attempt to raise profits or to recover whatever was paid in bribes during the procurement 
stage (Wells, 24). The problem is so endemic that estimates of financial losses to corruption 
in the sector are estimated between 15 to 30 percent per year (Hawkins 2013).  
 
Relying on focus group meetings with government officials in La Paz, Klitgaard and 
coauthors (2000) uncover other points of vulnerability in city government. Taxation and 
procurement are two activities highlighted by the authors (Klitgaard et al., 53). Turning to a 
different study, CMS Transparency (2015) uses survey data to measure perceptions and 
experiences with public services in New Delhi. The report finds that government officials 
are often content with bribe payments as low as 10 rupees (approximately US$0.15) when 
administering small public services. In another relevant study, Anechiarico and Jacobs 
(1996) explore New York City’s long-standing efforts to control corruption, recounting 
some of the scandals that have impacted the city’s public administration. 
 
Our study builds on the research cited above, but also on efforts to analyze corruption data 
in the hands of local authorities. For instance, Graycar and Villa (2011) dissect 72 cases of 
proven government corruption in New York City. The city’s Department of Investigation 
shared the information with the authors, who find that private citizens and government 
officials are equally likely to initiate a corrupt transaction. They also find that bribe 
payment amounts tend to be surprisingly low (a majority of them are less than US$1,000) 
and that government officials who enjoy high levels of discretion (e.g., inspectors) seem 
most vulnerable to corruption. These results, while anchored to a single jurisdiction, stem 
from studying actual instances of corruption; thus, they offer relatively reliable insights 




Because corruption is difficult to study empirically, a number of researchers have relied on 
survey data based on self-reports of bribery (e.g., Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia 2005; 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Others have devised randomized control trials to 
learn more about the phenomenon. For example, Marianne Bertrand and coauthors (2007) 
randomly assigned individuals to experimental groups. One served as control. Another 
featured an incentive condition, which involved promising an extra payment to those who 
obtained a license within a specific time window. The results show that incentivized 
                                                        
5 As Fisman and Golden (2017) explain, “public construction is both necessary—on an epic scale that 
makes it even easier to bury graft in the balance sheet—and out of the public eye, two conditions that 
make it perennially vulnerable to corruption” (94). 
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individuals, while not actually learning how to drive, obtained licenses more quickly 
through bribe payments. 
 
The studies referenced thus far show that there are several methods for exploring the 
subject of corruption. Our own approach involves examining the official claims submitted 
to an ACA. While we are convinced about the merits to our methodology, we wish to 
recognize from the outset that analyzing a dataset of corruption-related claims has its 
limitations. For one, the dataset may be manipulated for political reasons. Another issue—
one that Graycar (2015, 91) underscores—is that official reports of corruption may be 
recorded incorrectly. It is also possible that not all corruption is reported to authorities. 
After all, the ACA may not be trusted and the transaction costs of reporting may be 
perceived as high.  
 
In view of these concerns, we recommend that the results showcased here be treated as 
informative, but not necessarily conclusive. Our study exemplifies the meticulous and 
systematic review of sensitive data to gauge local corruption risks. What it does not offer is 
a definitive assessment of corruption in the district of interest. As the study took shape, we 
were careful to test all results against our knowledge about the district in question. This is 
knowledge that builds on a year’s worth of conducting field interviews in and about the 
district.6 We also made it a point to emphasize trends, since imprecisions in the way some 
claims were recorded would matter less when looking at averages.  
 
The fact that the claims we examined have long been kept confidential and have not been 
used for political purposes further bolster our sense that the dataset is a reliable source of 
information. Still, even after taking all these considerations into account, there is one 
remaining concern: some corruption events may have, in fact, gone unreported. In other 
words, our dataset may not fully reflect all the abuse that occurs in the district. For this 
reason, we recommend that future analyses of corruption-related claims also incorporate 
surveys about residents’ stated experiences with corruption (e.g., Hunt 2006), forensic 
techniques that infer corruption based on gaps in administrative data (e.g., Fisman and Wei 
2004), and field experiments wherein statistically significant differences in outcomes 
provide a measure of corruption (e.g., Olken 2007).7 
 
Another methodological point of note is that we do not name the urban district being 
studied. Following John Gardiner’s approach in The Politics of Corruption (1970), we do not 
disclose the exact setting since doing so is not necessary to understand the general dynamics 
of reporting and tracking corruption in an urban district.8 Anonymization makes it possible 
to study a sensitive subject while protecting both the individuals who step forward with 
                                                        
6 As a participant observer, Lagunes also spent approximately nine months among government 
officials in the district. 
7 For a thorough review of distinct approaches to studying corruption see Sandra Sequeira, “Advances in 
Measuring Corruption in the Field,” in New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption, edited by 
Danila Serra and Leonard Wantchekon, Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited (2012): 145-175. 
8 Publishing this study without naming the district should show that the authors are not interested in 
imposing their research on local political dynamics. That said, as more time passes, documents 
authored by Lagunes that relate to this study will name the district. 
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claims and the civil servants who end up implicated in the allegations. By handling the data 
with discretion and confidentiality, we hope to establish a precedent by which local 
governments will become more open to similar kinds of collaboration in the future. 
 
About the District 
 
In terms of location, the district exists within the perimeters of a city in central Mexico. It 
covers over 18 square miles or around 3 percent of the city’s surface area. The district’s 
small size, however, masks its actual importance.9 Around 10 percent of all firms in the city 
are located in the district. This helps explain why, according to one local expert, the district 
generates around 5 percent of the entire country’s GDP.10 
 
The responsibility of governing this important urban district falls on a mayor who is 
elected for a three-year term. The mayor is expected to oversee the work of over 5,000 
government employees who review and issue permits, assign public works contracts, build 
public libraries, monitor construction sites, regulate the informal sector, manage public 
markets, donate provisions to the impoverished, and conduct a number of other official 
activities. In all fairness, the district government fulfills its responsibilities relatively well. 
Compared to the other district governments in the city, the district being studied is among 
the most effective. It regularly solves over 80 percent of the 300,000 residents’ demands, 
such as pothole and streetlight repairs.  
 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the district has tended to rank high in human 
development indices (Partida and Tuirán 2000; UNDP 2004). In fact, less than 15 percent 
of its population is thought to be living below the poverty line.11 However, this is not to say 
that the district is free of problems. In certain neighborhoods, one can find houses with 
cardboard ceilings and 15-year-old girls being peddled as prostitutes. Moreover, as our 
study shows, the district is constantly at risk of corruption. Even the public graveyard is 
vulnerable. Some years ago, a female resident approached the mayor to denounce the 
administrator of the public cemetery. The resident cried as she denounced the 
administrator for disinterring and selling the remains of two of her deceased relatives. This 
and other claims deserve to be investigated, which is why the district government counts 
on a Contraloría to follow up on all allegations of corruption. 
 
The Contraloría is the local anticorruption agency that reports not to the district 
government, but to the city government. Similar to other ACAs elsewhere, this one tends to 
be staffed by lawyers who are responsible for investigating claims of failure or abuse. These 
claims are registered in person or through other means, including a hotline and an online 
platform. A key concern, though, is that the ACA tends to approach claims individually, 
                                                        
9 The district is approximately the same size as New Haven, CT, a city that, over the years, has received 
a good deal of attention from political scientists (see, for example: Rae 2003; Dahl 2005 [1974]).  
10 The expert referenced is a former economic advisor to the district government. 
11 The statistic referenced was obtained from the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy 
(Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social–CONEVAL), which measures 
poverty in Mexico and evaluates social programs and policies of the federal government. 
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without separating them into categories and analyzing them in a way that would give the 




We aim to impose order on a database of 445 claims submitted to the local anticorruption 
agency over a 24-month period. A majority of these claims (N=364) identify the claimant 
by name. Using these names to infer gender, 61 percent of claimants are men and the 
remaining 39 percent are women.12 Most claims also indicate whether the claimant is a 
citizen or a government official. This distinction may not be fully reliable considering that 
some officials submit their claims as private citizens. However, mindful of this caveat, it 
appears that the majority of claimants (roughly 70 percent) are concerned individuals who 
do not work in government. 
 
Another point worth highlighting is that the database includes both verified and unverified 
claims; thus, as a precaution, all claims should be treated as allegations. Furthermore, not 
all claims relate to corruption. For this reason, each claim is examined carefully to 
determine the likelihood that it refers to bribery, extortion, or a subtler form of 
malfeasance. All claims are then methodically grouped into one of three categories: Not 
Corruption, Possible Corruption, or Likely Corruption.13 Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
claims based on this three-part typology. It shows that 78 percent of units in the database 
have at least a possible relation to corruption, while the remaining 22 percent refer to 
human resource issues and various other concerns. 
                                                        
12 The gender imbalance could be explained by the fact that across Latin America, male citizens are 
more likely to interact with government officials than their female counterparts (Seligson 2006). 
13 The process of categorizing claims based on their perceived link to corruption lends itself to 
interpretation. Thus, to reduce the level of individual subjectivity, our approach involved having the 
three authors examine the dataset independently. Lagunes initiated the categorization with some 
examples. Grajales then categorized the remaining claims, while setting aside those she was less sure 
about. At that point, Lagunes went back and reviewed each claim, paying special attention to those that 
were not yet classified. After this, Lagunes and Grajales went back and forth one or two more times for 
the sake of quality control. Nazal then stepped in with fresh eyes to review the resulting categorization. 
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Note: Over a 24-month period, the local anticorruption agency recorded 445 claims. Of these, 22 percent do not 
appear to involve corruption; instead, they have to do with public service needs and other concerns. The 
remaining claims are distributed as follows. A majority of claims (66 percent) may or may not refer to corruption; 
thus, they fit under the Possible Case of Corruption label. A small segment of claims (12 percent) are less ambiguous 
about malfeasance; these belong in the Likely Case of Corruption category. A key takeaway from the analysis is that 
the anticorruption agency should prioritize claims belonging to this last category. A related insight is that the 
agency would reduce its administrative burden if claims unrelated to corruption were referred to the relevant 
authorities from the outset, rather than added to the caseload. 
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Edited Description  
of the Claim 
Probably Not 














Obstruction in the 
process of verifying 
a vehicle; officials 
give preference to 
expeditors. 
0 1 0 
Expeditors are bureaucratic 
lobbyists. There is no 
legitimate reason why they 
should receive preferential 
treatment over regular 
citizens. This is especially 
true considering that 
expeditors have been 
known to secure 
preferential treatment by 
means of bribing 




The citizen requests 
a de facto permit 
approval, given that 
the government 
failed to issue a 
building occupation 
permit within the 
legal time limit. 
0 1 0 
De facto permit approval (or, 
in Spanish, afirmativa ficta) 
exists as a legal mechanism 
to avoid bureaucratic 
holdups. Developers have 
been known to bribe 
government officials in 
order to get them to delay 
the review of a permit long 
enough to trigger a de facto 
permit approval.  
Department of 
Public Works 
The contract for a 
public infrastructure 
project was paid in 
full even though the 
project was not 
actually built. 
0 0 1 
Phantom public works are 
infrastructure projects paid 
for by the state that never 
actually get built. Officials 
have been known to 
tolerate phantom public 






officials are charging 
citizens cash in 
exchange for 
providing a public 
service. 
0 0 1 
The claim describes the 
illegal practice of charging 
for public services that 
should be provided for free 
or paid for following strict 
guidelines. The concern is 







officials assigned to 
the Department of 
Legal & Government 
Affairs receive a 
salary without 
showing up to work. 
0 0 1 
The claim describes a form 
of shirking known as ghost 
employment—i.e., the 
practice of being on the 
payroll, but not actually 
conducting work for the 
victim organization.  
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Table 1 provides additional details about the classification of claims in the database. It 
reveals examples of claims fitting exclusively under the two main categories of interest: 
Possible Corruption and Likely Corruption. The first example describes how government 
officials assigned to the Department of Legal & Government Affairs purportedly prioritize 
the needs of a select few over the needs of regular citizens. Specifically, it describes how 
officials grant expeditors immediate and hassle-free access to the vehicle registration 
counter at the local Department of Motor Vehicles, while regular citizens are required to 
wait in line. Expeditors are bureaucratic lobbyists hired to accelerate the acquisition of 
government permits. In Mexico, expeditors regularly resort to corrupt tactics in order to 
achieve their goals (Lagunes 2012b, 99-100).14 Thus, the particular claim is classified under 
the Possible Corruption category, because there is some probability that the preferential 
treatment reflects a quid pro quo relationship between the expeditor and officials in the 
local government.  
 
The second example presented in Table 1 centers on a distinctive attribute of Mexican 
administrative law. Afirmativa ficta, which loosely translates to English as de facto permit 
approval, refers to a legal mechanism by which citizens secure a permit after government 
officials fail to respond to an application within the legally specified time window. The de 
facto permit approval was created as a means to avoid bureaucratic holdups; however, 
interviews by Lagunes reveal that the legal mechanism is subject to abuse. The case is 
categorized as possibly involving corruption, since bribed officials have been known to 
deliberately “sit on” a permit application as a means of causing the delays that trigger a de 
facto permit approval. 
 
The final three examples shown in Table 1 describe events that involve more obvious 
forms of corruption. For instance, the third example speaks of public works projects that 
are paid for but not actually built. The fourth one warns of officials who require under the 
table payments for a public service. The fifth and final example points to local government 
employees who receive a regular paycheck without showing up to work.15 Claims of this 
sort speak to the theft of public money, thus providing a compelling reminder of why 
corruption should be controlled. 
 
Given the variety of claims in the dataset, there is yet another, more fine-grained approach 
to classifying them. This other typology is depicted in Figure 3. It is also described in the 
below and in Appendix 1. The typology has 17 subcategories that fit under three broader 
categories. The three major categories are Regulation of Local Economic Activity, Public Service 
Quality, and Neglect or Violation of Official Duties. 
                                                        
14 Expeditors are known as gestores or coyotes in Mexico. One of the expeditors interviewed admitted 
to paying a mayor over US$500,000 in exchange for special permits. 
15 Ghost workers in Mexico are known as aviadores.  
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The Regulation of Local Economic Activity category gathers claims about the failure by the 
local government to ensure that a business in the formal or informal sector acts within the 
bounds of the law. The Public Service Quality category highlights issues with the way that 
local government officials approach and interact with private citizens. Finally, the Neglect or 
Violation of Official Duties category splits into 11 subcategories that, broadly speaking, refer 
to problems with the way that the local government functions. These problems are 
associated with the internal mismanagement of resources and information, and are 
thought to be caused by the actions or inactions of local government officials. 
The subcategories are meant to cover most of the deficiencies that one might find in a local 
government. For this reason, they are the cornerstone of our study. Four of the 
subcategories—specifically, those highlighted in Figure 3—describe inappropriate behavior 
that does not relate to corruption. For instance, a subcategory listed under Public Service 
Quality describes officials who allegedly approach citizens with a bad attitude. Similarly, the 
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first subcategory under Neglect or Violation of Official Duties refers to issues that would 
typically concern an office of human resources.  
 
In contrast to the previously highlighted subcategories, there are two that by definition 
always refer to corruption. The first refers to the inappropriate use by public officials of 
nonfinancial government resources (see subcategory III.10 in Figure 3). Examples of this 
sort of claim state that vehicles belonging to the local government were used for non-
official business, including to help political candidates on Election Day. The second 
encompasses bribery and kickback schemes, such as the allegation that a government 
official demands a financial reward for allowing a business to compete for a government 
contract (see subcategory III.11 in Figure 3). 
 
However, not all corruption-related claims are as obviously linked to the abuse of public 
office as the aforementioned examples (all subcategories without a gray or black 
background in Figure 3). Some require a measure of local knowledge to be properly 
interpreted. For instance, the subcategory Unpaid Contracts speaks to instances in which the 
local government has failed to pay for services or goods rendered by a private party. Some 
contracts go unpaid because the local government lacks the resources to meet all of its 
financial commitments. That being said, according to an interview with the then-head of 
the Department of Administrative Services, other contracts go unpaid because officials in 
the accounts payable office withhold payment until they are paid a bribe. Given this 
revelation, claims submitted to an anticorruption agency suggesting that a contract has not 
been paid should trigger an investigation to test whether corruption is involved. 
 
Having described the data and the classification process, the next section of the study 
highlights the main findings from the analysis. It identifies the subcategories and 




Though the data is rich in detail, for the sake of clarity, this study only highlights the most 
significant results. These results are presented in two parts. The first examines some 
descriptive statistics about the claims and the individuals who submit them. The second 
focuses exclusively on claims that have at least some possible link to corruption. Crucially, 
it is in this part of the report that the most common claims and the worst offending 
government departments are flagged. 
 
As a starting point, it is worth recalling that Figure 2, which was featured earlier in this 
study, divides the claims based on the extent to which they refer to corruption. 
Considering that not all claims relate to corruption, one way to reduce the anticorruption 
agency’s caseload would be to treat differently the 22 percent of cases under the Not 
Corruption category. Irrelevant claims should be redirected to the appropriate office.16 This 
                                                        
16 This is the approach used by Singapore’s renowned Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. 
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tactic would allow the agency to focus on the cases that, more strictly speaking, fall within 
its realm of responsibility. 
 
On a related note, Figure 4 examines what that caseload would look like over a two-year 
period if the anticorruption agency only focused on relevant claims. Concentrating solely 
on the 352 cases involving possible or likely corruption, the pulse graph shows that the 
anticorruption agency receives an average of 8.88 claims per month. This number may 
seem relatively small; however, the fact that 66 percent of claims have an ambiguous 
relation to corruption—hence, their place in the Possible Corruption category—underscores 
the challenge of trying to validate most claims. To be able to meet said challenge, the 
anticorruption agency needs the support—financial and otherwise—to conduct proper 
investigations. That being said, the anticorruption agency need not wait for additional 
resources to act; it can start by prioritizing claims in the Likely Corruption category. After all, 
few would question the need to follow up on these allegations. 
 






Note: Focusing solely on 352 cases of possible and likely corruption, the graph shows that the anticorruption agency 
records a minimum of five and a maximum of 15 corruption-related claims per month. In fact, the average is 
somewhere around 8.4 relevant claims per month. The graph also indicates that, over the course of two years, the 
district being studied saw a modest increase in the number of claims recorded by the anticorruption agency. 
 
But before the local anticorruption agency adopts any particular crime-fighting strategy, it 
would do well to study the patterns found among the relevant claims. Doing so would allow 
the agency to better understand who is being victimized by corruption, what forms of 
corruption are most common, and who is doing the victimizing.  
 
So, who is being victimized by corruption? Earlier in this study, we noted that the average 
claimant is a male citizen. Figure 5 sheds further light on the profile of the typical claimant 
by adding socioeconomic information to the analysis. The graph builds on 163 claims of 
possible or likely corruption for which the home neighborhood of the individual 
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generating the claim is known. In order to gauge the socioeconomic status of some of the 
claimants, the neighborhood information is crossed with data from the National Institute 
of Statistics and Geography (in Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI). 
The results show that half of the claims emanate from wealthy and upper-middle class 
neighborhoods. Another 40 percent of claims are from individuals living in middle-class 
neighborhoods, while the remaining 9 percent of claims are from individuals in poorer 
areas of the district. In sum, the dataset collects more claims from the relatively affluent. 
 






Note: The dataset includes 163 claims of possible and likely corruption for which the neighborhood of the 
individual presenting the complaint is known. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (in Spanish: 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) publishes neighborhood-level measures for the urban 
district being studied. Applying a 1 to 5 scale of socioeconomic exclusion based on INEGI data, where 1 denotes 
greater wealth than 5, 50% of claims are from individuals living in more well-to-do neighborhoods; that is, in 
neighborhoods that fall under the numbers 1 and 2 of the scale. Another 40% of claims are from individuals living 
in lower-middle class neighborhoods (number 3 on the scale). And only 9% of claims are from individuals in 
poorer neighborhoods (numbers 4 and 5 on the scale). Thus, taken together, the local anticorruption agency 
attracts relatively more claims from wealthier individuals. This is probably explained by the fact that the district is 
relatively affluent by Mexican standards, and so the graph’s distribution reflects the local socioeconomic reality. 
 
 
One might assume that the socioeconomic bias in the dataset is driven by reticence among 
the poor to report wrongdoing. If poverty is one of the factors that makes individuals 
vulnerable to those who abuse their power (Fried, Lagunes and Venkataramani 2010), then 
that same vulnerability would cause the poor to fear retribution from complaining about 
the abuse. However, it is important to recall that the district is relatively affluent by 
Mexican standards; thus, the skew in the data may be explained by basic probability. In 
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other words, given the socioeconomic profile of the district, perhaps it is more likely that 
wealthier residents would experience corruption. However, rather than stressing this 
particular finding, we recommend actively engaging poorer residents to make sure their 
corruption-related concerns are considered and not minimized. 
 
Another approach to understanding the claims is to organize them into one of the 17 
subcategories put forth in this study. That is precisely what Figure 6 aims to accomplish. 
The first thing to notice when examining the chart is that the top five subcategories—
collecting 59.9 percent of claims in the dataset—are: Access Constraints to Government 
Information (19%); Failure to Comply with Duties (14.5%); Bribery and Kickback Schemes (10.2%); 
Problems with a Private Development (9.4%); and Misuse of Public Space (6.8%). Another way to 
think about these results is that the theft of public funds and bureaucratic delay in the 
review of building permit applications are the sorts of concerns that feature most 
prominently in the dataset. Yet another way to think about these results is in terms of 
examples, such as: an administrator of one of the public swimming pools pockets revenue 
from membership fees. 
 
Of the five subcategories listed above, the one that concentrates the greatest number of 
claims is Access Constraints to Government Information. As the title suggests, the subcategory 
refers to claims that public officials are limiting access to government information. The 
alleged restrictions to transparency include refusals to answer public information requests; 
the suspicious loss of documents held by government; or situations in which an interested 
party is excluded from an official meeting where critical information is disclosed. 
 
The second subcategory that stands out in Figure 6 is Failure to Comply with Duties. This 
subcategory highlights the poor work performance of government officials. Few claims of 
this variety have a direct connection to corruption; instead, they more closely represent 
some form of inefficiency. However, it should be noted that corruption and inefficiency 
are related phenomena. Both can be thought of as different forms of government waste 
(Bandiera, Prat and Valletti 2009). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that corruption 
and inefficiency are strongly correlated (Dal Bó and Rossi 2007), and that the two enjoy a 
mutually reinforcing relationship (Mauro 1995).17 Thus, there are reasons for the local 
anticorruption agency to afford this subcategory significant attention. An example should 
lend support to this recommendation. 
 
A number of claims that count as Failure to Comply with Duties involve trash collection. One 
such claim reads, “The resident complains that trash collectors refused to service her 
building for two weeks.” On the face of it, this case would seem unrelated to corruption. 
However, local interviews reveal that residents are often forced to pay an unofficial quota 
to garbage collectors in order to guarantee that their refuse is collected. Therefore, this and 
other claims about inefficiencies in public service provision often merit investigation for 
their potential links to corruption. 
                                                        
17 Similar to corruption, inefficiency produces suboptimal outcomes from a public interest 
perspective. This is precisely why anticorruption agencies around the world, such as New York City’s 
Department of Investigation, tend to target both phenomena (City of New York 2004). 
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Turning to the third subcategory featured in Figure 6, Bribery & Kickback Schemes clearly has 
a less ambiguous relationship to corruption. Indeed, the subcategory refers to the 
quintessential form of abuse of public office for private gain, grouping claims that one or 
more public officials are making an illegal profit through bribery or the theft of public 
financial resources. One such claim alleges that a government inspector responsible for 
regulating the informal sector asked a street vendor for a US$300 bribe, presumably to 
allow the street vendor to conduct her business without an official permit. Another claim, 
while not specifying the wrongful act, suggests that officials made an illicit profit worth 
approximately US$180,000. 
 
The remaining subcategories shown in Figure 6 can be analyzed with information offered 
in Appendix 1. For example, readers can note that the fourth subcategory highlighted in the 
chart refers to Problems with a Private Development. This subcategory collects 9.4 percent of 
all claims of possible and likely corruption in the dataset. As explained in the Appendix, the 
subcategory refers to, “Claims directed against […] buildings not owned by government that 
are undergoing construction, remodeling, or demolition.” The Appendix also offers two 
examples of claims that fit this subcategory. 
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Note: The bar chart focuses solely on the 352 cases of possible and likely corruption, highlighting the most 
pressing issues from the perspective of government integrity. It shows that the subcategory concentrating the 
greatest percentage of corruption-related claims is Access Constraints to Government Information, thus warning that 
the district being studied may be restricting government transparency. The next subcategory that stands out in 
the chart is Failure to Comply with Duties, which groups complaints about the work performance of government 
officials. An example of such a complaint speaks to irregularities in how local officials handle government 
purchases. Another example refers to trash collection, which could signal that trash collectors are demanding 
bribes. The third most prominent subcategory on the chart is Bribery & Kickback Schemes, which collects allegations 
of officials attempting to make an illegal profit. Then, the following three subcategories (i.e., Problems with a Private 
Development, Misuse of Public Space, and Problems with a Business) all refer to possible or likely corruption in the local 
government’s regulation of economic activity. 
 
 
Beyond examining the types of claims that weigh most heavily on the district, it is also 
useful to understand which officials are prompting a majority of the claims. This can be 
accomplished by grouping claims of possible or likely corruption by agency, as seen in 
Figure 7. The figure shows that the five most problematic agencies collect 79.5 percent of 
all relevant claims. These five agencies are the Department of Legal & Governmental 
Affairs, the Department of Buildings & City Planning, the Mayor’s Office, the Department 
of Public Works, and the Department of Community Affairs. 
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Note: Focusing solely the 352 cases of possible and likely corruption, the chart highlights the administrative areas 
of the local government that concentrate the greatest number of claims. It shows that the Department of Legal & 
Governmental Affairs is by far the most problematic. This is a large agency responsible for a variety of functions 
(from issuing marriage licenses to regulating street vending); its officials frequently come into direct contact with 
citizens. Another department that stands out in the chart is that of Buildings & City Planning, which is responsible 
for regulating urban development in the district being studied. Next on the chart is the Mayor’s Office. While the 
heads of local government—including the local government being studied—have been known to engage in 
corrupt activities, most claims in this category come from citizens who hold the mayor responsible for the 
misdeeds of lower-level officials. Thus, if the focus is on the district government’s subunits, then the third 
department concentrating the greatest number of claims is actually that of Public Works.  
 
 
The Department of Legal & Governmental Affairs draws the greatest number of 
corruption-related claims, in part because of its size. The agency is responsible for myriad 
subunits, such as the local Marriage Bureau, the Single-Window System for Permit 
Applications, and the Public Markets & Street Vending Commission. Thus, given the 
breadth of its responsibilities, it is almost to be expected that the Department of Legal & 
Government Affairs would attract a significant number of claims. That said, the agency’s 
poor standing is likely also a reflection of the corruptibility of some of its activities, such as 
the regulation of the informal sector. 
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Other agencies that stand out in Figure 7 are the Department of Buildings & City Planning 
and the Department of Public Works. Together, the two agencies regulate the built 
environment in the district. A few reasons have been put forth to explain corruption in this 
area of government. For one, the vast amount of capital committed to the construction of 
buildings and infrastructure is thought to create opportunities for rent-seeking behavior 
(Castalia 2004, 7; Fisman and Golden 2017, 94). A related issue is that the complexity of 
many buildings and infrastructure projects generates room for regulatory discretion, which 
then serves as an incentive for corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016, 69). Along 
similar lines, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) explain that the building industry is especially 
vulnerable to corruption because the sector relies on idiosyncratic capital, meaning that it 
is difficult to standardize the cost of projects. 
 
The Mayor’s Office is another agency collecting a relatively high number of claims. This 
may be partially explained by the fact that the Mayor’s Office is often held responsible for 
unpopular policies. It may also be the case that the Mayor’s Office is blamed for the 
corruption of agencies under its supervision. Whatever the explanation, it is concerning 
that the Mayor’s Office collects so many corruption-related claims. The district’s residents 
have imperfect information about how its local government works; thus, many residents 
look to the mayor for clues about the efficiency and integrity of the district government as 
a whole. If the mayor is perceived to be corrupt, then that signals to residents that 
corruption is to be expected when interacting with other local officials. This is what 
Rothstein (2013) refers to when he suggests that “the fish rots from the head down.” 
 
As a next and final step, this study deepens the analysis by examining only cases of Likely 
Corruption. Focusing exclusively on this subset of claims drastically reduces the number of 
observations (N=50). Still, the exercise brings to light some useful information. For one, the 
Department of Legal & Governmental Affairs again appears as one of the worst offending 
agencies. The same is true for the Department of Community Affairs, the Department of 
Public Works, and the Department of Buildings & City Planning. Across these four 
agencies, Bribery and Kickback Schemes tends to collect the most claims. It is only in the 
Department of Buildings & City Planning that other types of claims feature as prominently 
(see Appendix 2). 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our decision to focus on urban corruption should not be misinterpreted. We are not 
suggesting that cities are generally more corrupt than, say, rural areas. In fact, the opposite 
seems true—urbanization tends to correlate with lower levels of corruption (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2015, 88). Time-honored traditions may view cities with skepticism, teaching that 
they were founded under shameful circumstances.18 Prominent urbanists might even warn 
that cities are prone to disorder (Hall 1998). And yet, contemporary empirical research 
offers evidence that the expansion of cities fosters human prosperity (Glaeser 2012). It is 
this prosperity that explains much of the migration to cities—indeed, people vote with 
their feet (Tiebout 1956), and many of them are choosing to live in cities because they offer 
better wages, as well as better access to health and education services (de Soto 1989, 9-10). 
 
Still, in spite of the promises of urban life, cities are no panacea. Our analysis of claims 
submitted to the local anticorruption agency of an urbanized district in central Mexico 
sheds light on the poorly understood phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption. It reveals 
trends that are, perhaps narrowly, anchored to the district being studied. However, these 
trends result from applying a set of categories and subcategories that are transferable to 
other urban districts across Mexico and Latin America. In this sense, the present study 
models how anticorruption agencies in Mexico and beyond may structure their caseloads. 
 
The study’s specific findings first show that the anticorruption agency in the district being 
studied is burdened by irrelevant claims—that is, claims that do not refer to corruption. 
Forwarding these claims to the appropriate authorities, such as the district’s Human 
Resources Department, would allow the anticorruption agency to better direct its efforts. 
 
The study also finds that the subcategory concentrating the greatest number of corruption-
related claims is Access Constraints to Government Information. This suggests that individuals are 
sensitive to limits to their right to know—as they should be since government transparency is 
an important issue with implications for public service provision, trust in the democratic 
process, and the rule of law. Fortunately, administrative deficiencies of this sort originate 
from within the government, and so their solution is largely within the ACA’s realm of 
influence. For one, the ACA could adopt a similar strategy as that used by Lagunes and 
Pocasangre (2017) to monitor each agency’s level of transparency. This strategy would 
involve using aliases to submit Freedom of Information requests, which would then be used 
to evaluate an agency’s tendency to provide timely and relevant information to citizens. 
                                                        
18 For example, the book of Genesis in the Hebrew Bible chronicles the story of two brothers, Cain 
and Abel. Overtaken with feelings of jealousy, Cain murders Abel. As punishment, Cain is banished 
and goes on to found Enoch, the first city. Another illustration comes from Roman mythology, which 
describes events believed to have led to the founding of Rome. Romulus and Remus were twin 
brothers who had a fight. After killing his brother, Romulus is said to have become Rome’s first king 
and namesake. 
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Among the other types of claims that stand out is Failure to Comply with Duties, which refers to 
claims about the work performance of government officials. On the face of it, many claims 
of this sort describe mere inefficiencies. However, as is discussed at length in this study, the 
fact that inefficiencies often mask actual corruption means that anticorruption agencies 
cannot avoid investigating claims of this nature. The study also finds that local 
anticorruption agencies must redouble their efforts to curb bribery and kickback schemes. 
These are obvious forms of corruption that one would hope are in decline; thus, their 
continued presence in highly urbanized districts should give rise to concern. 
Finally, the study finds that agencies enjoying ample discretionary powers concentrate a 
greater number of corruption-related claims. Mindful of this, the local anticorruption agency 
should develop an improved strategy that gives priority to certain agencies and activities 
over others. Through targeted audits, high-profile prosecutions, and clear messaging, the 
anticorruption agency can signal that there are real legal consequences to the abuse of public 
office. Government officials must be mindful that their decisions are subject to review. 




A Typology of Urban Corruption and Other Irregularities 
 
The first category is Regulation of Local Economic Activity. It refers to instances in which the 
local government has allegedly failed to prevent a business in the formal or informal sector 








1. Problems with  
a Business 
Claims directed against a private business, such as a store, 
restaurant, nightclub, or bar.  
The business obstructs the sidewalk, 
and so the claim includes a request 
that the business receive a 
government inspection. 
2. Problems with  
a Private 
Development 
Claims directed against a private development. Private 
developments are buildings not owned by the 
government that are undergoing construction, 
remodeling, or demolition.  
1. Damage to a property by a nearby 
building that is under construction.  
2. The building violates the zoning 
law. 
3. Misuse of  
Public Space 
Claims against commercial activities that occur in a public 
space without an official permit. 
1. Phone booths installed on the 
sidewalk without an official permit. 
2. Violation of a program that 
regulates informal merchants who 
sell their products in a public space. 
 
The second category is Public Service Quality. Claims in this category refer to problems with 




Sub-category Description Example(s) of Claims 
Public Service 
Quality 
1. Bad Attitude on 
the Part of Gov’t 
Officials 
Claims directed against one or several public officials who 
allegedly approach citizens with a bad attitude. In this case, 
bad attitude includes an arrogant demeanor, ignoring citizens, 
being rude, and even resorting to physical violence. If the 
claim discusses the mistreatment of one official by another 
official, then it falls under the Labor Issues subcategory.  
In a display of arrogance, the official 




Claims alleging unequal treatment or preferential treatment 
offered by a public official to an individual or group of 
citizens without necessarily reporting a payment to secure 
such a service. This subcategory could incorporate cases of 
nepotism (i.e., favorable treatment to a family member over 
a more qualified but unrelated individual) and cronyism 
(that is, special treatment to members of one’s group, rather 
members of other groups. 
1. Obstruction in the process of 
verifying a vehicle; officials give 
preference to expeditors. 
2. Garbage truck operator does not 
pick up the trash of neighborhood 
residents. Instead, he only picks up 
the trash of one of the businesses in 
the area. 
3. Abuse of 
Authority or 
Extortion 
Claims of alleged pressure by one or more government 
officials. For a claim to fit under this subcategory it must be 
reported by a citizen; otherwise, if the claim discusses abuse 
of authority or extortion of one official by another official, it 
should be categorized under Labor Issues. The exception to 
the aforementioned rule is any case in which a superior 
makes sexual advances on lower-level officials. Also, if the 
claim specifies that a public official is demanding a bribe, 
then it fits under Bribery and Kickback Schemes. 
Displeased with the constant 
government inspections to his/her 
business.  
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The third category is Neglect or Violation of Official Duties. It encompasses 11 subcategories 
that speak to problems with the way that the local government functions. These problems 
are associated with mismanagement of resources and information, and are thought to be 









1. Workplace Issues 
Claims that would typically concern an office of 
human resources. The claims may address sexual 
harassment among co-workers, union-related 
concerns, arrogant treatment by a superior, etc. Cases 
in which superiors abuse their power, such as when 
they sexually harass a lower-level official, fall under 
Abuse of Authority or Extortion. 
The union recognizes that one of its 
members, a local official, was issued 
an administrative sanction. 
2. Failure to Comply 
with Duties 
Claims alleging poor work performance by a 
government official. On the one hand, the subcategory 
excludes claims about delayed administrative 
procedures (claims of this sort fit under Red Tape), and 
claims alleging lack of attention by a government 
official (such claims fit under Bad Attitude on the Part of 
Government Officials). On the other hand, the 
subcategory includes claims describing an interrupted 
public service, but only if the reason for the 
interruption is not that a public official is demanding a 
bribe (such claims fit under Bribery and Kickback 
Schemes). 
Dissatisfaction with the trash 
collectors. They refuse to do  
their work.  
3. Breach of Agreement 
Claiming the alleged breach of political agreements 
by the government. This subcategory also 
encompasses acts of government that violate a  
court ruling.  
1. The local government has not 
fulfilled its commitment to have 
official inspectors conduct site visits.  
2. The local government has failed to 
comply with a court sentence. 
4. Red Tape 
Claims suggesting that an administrative procedure 
is delayed or on hold. An example of an 
administrative procedure is the review of a  
permit application. 
The citizen has complied with all the 
administrative procedures required 
to merge properties, but officials 
continue to withhold authorization 
for the merger. 
5. Problems with a Public 
Work 
Claims highlighting an issue with a public 
infrastructure project. Such projects include the paving 
of roads, fencing, building maintenance, etc. Claims 
under this subcategory are different to Unpaid 
Contracts since they do not allege the lack of payment 
by a public entity. 
1. There are irregularities in the 
construction of a trash collection 
facility. 
2. A relatively expensive public work 
has been paid for without actually 
getting built.  
6. Unpaid Contracts 
Claims that the local government has failed to pay 
for services or goods rendered by a private party. 
The concern is that some suppliers are not paid until 
they bribe officials in Accounts Payable. 
The local government has failed to 
pay a contractor for the work done 
on a local public market. 










7. Access Constraints 
to Gov’t Information 
Claims that government officials are limiting access to 
public information. The alleged restrictions to 
transparency include refusing to answer Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests; the non-delivery or loss 
of information held by government; or situations in which 
an individual is excluded from an official meeting where 
critical information is disclosed.  
1. Supplier was not allowed into a 
meeting organized by the local 
government where the terms of a 
public tender were discussed.  
2. The transition between 
administrations was handled 
improperly; outgoing government 
officials did not hand over all relevant 
information to the incoming team. 
8. Mistakes in or 
Tampering with Gov’t 
Information 
Claims stating that an official datum, document, or 
archive was lost or tampered with. Archives or official 
documents include government registries, payment 
invoices, deeds that are part of a building record, etc. 
Claims under this subcategory are similar to Access 
Constraints to Government Information. The key difference is 
that this subcategory does not highlight actions by public 
officials that restrict access to public information; instead, 
it points to actions by public officials that affect the 
integrity of said information. Also, if the claim refers to a 
datum, document, or archive that was lost or tampered 
with involving a business, private development, or 
informal merchant it belongs here as opposed to any of 
the subcategories in the Regulation of Local Economic 
Activity category.  
1. Destruction of official documents. 
2. Tampering of government 
records. 
9. De Facto Permit 
Approval 
Claims mentioning the term afirmativa ficta, which loosely 
translates to de facto permit approval. The term refers to a 
legal mechanism by which citizens secure a permit after 
government officials fail to respond to a permit application 
within the legally specified time window. The de facto permit 
approval was created as a means to avoid the problem of 
bureaucratic holdup; however, the legal mechanism is 
subject to abuse. The case is categorized as possibly 
involving corruption, since officials have been known to 
ignore a permit application on purpose in exchange for a 
bribe and as a means of triggering a de facto permit approval. 
Although there are few claims relating to this topic, it is 
awarded its own subcategory because of its high impact. 
 
10. Misuse of Non-
financial Gov’t 
Resources 
Claims suggesting the inappropriate use by public officials 
of nonfinancial government resources, including the 
clientelistic use of nonfinancial government resources to 
support a political candidate or party in an election. 
Nonfinancial resources include computers, vehicles, fuel, 
tools, etc. This subcategory differs from Bribery and 
Kickback Schemes since it does not include the 
government’s financial resources. Since time is considered 
a nonfinancial resource, this subcategory also includes 
instances in which public officials inappropriately spend 
their work hours on leisure.  
Complaint about the improper use 
of a white pick-up truck owned by 
the local government. It was used 
for the non-official business of 
helping someone move their private 
belongings. 
11. Bribery and 
Kickback Schemes 
Claims alleging that one or more public officials are 
making an illegal profit through bribery or theft of 
financial resources owed to or owned by the local 
government. The subcategory is different from Misuse of 
Nonfinancial Government Resources, since this subcategory 
refers exclusively to the misappropriation of public 
financial resources. In addition, the subcategory includes 
cases of public officials taking a public salary without 
showing up to work. 
Government official demands a  
10 percent cut from government 
contracts in order to allow potential 
vendors to compete for said 
contracts. 










Note: When focusing exclusively on the 50 cases of likely corruption, the four subcategories 
concentrating the most claims are: Bribery and Kickback Schemes (N=34); Misuse of Nonfinancial Government 
Resources (N=9); Failure to Comply with Duties (N=4); and Abuse of Authority or Extortion (N=3). For three of 
the four categories, the Department of Legal & Governmental Affairs appears as one of the worst 
offending agencies. That said, the Department of Community Affairs, the Department of Public Works, 
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Note: When focusing exclusively on the 50 cases of likely corruption, the four departments that are most 
frequently alluded to are: the Department of Legal & Governmental Affairs (N=14); the Department of 
Public Works (N=11); the Department of Buildings & City Planning (N=8); and the Department of 
Community Affairs (N=5). Across all four departments, Bribery and Kickback Schemes tends to collect the 
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